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1 Introduction
Securities based on subprime mortgages played a central role in the Financial Crisis
of 2007–2008. The shortcomings of models for pricing these securities became
apparent when real estate prices started to fall and mortgages became delinquent.
Difficulties valuing these securities led to widespread problems trading them, (Dwyer
and Tkac 2011).
The period leading up to the crisis was one of dramatic growth in asset backed
securities and structured financial products. These products were tranched and rated
and acquired by investors across the world. Chiesa (2008) shows that pooled and
tranched securities can generate optimal risk transfer, although one rationale for the
issuance of pooled and tranched securities is an informational advantage about
underlying asset quality enjoyed by informed sellers (DeMarzo 2005). Increased
demand for structured securities led to an expansion in the range of underlying assets
(Benmelech and Dlugosz 2009) and the creation of structured securities based on
subprime mortgages increased dramatically. Mian and Sufi (2009) provide evidence
that an increased demand for these products affected the market for subprime mort-
gages by resulting in less stringent lending criteria and contributing to their subse-
quent growth.
The spread of this crisis from a relatively small sector of the financial
system across markets and international borders resulted in widespread financial
distress.1Among other effects, banks in much of the world suffered substantial losses
followed by serious retrenchment and restructuring. The turbulence and ensuing lack
of confidence spread to other asset markets and the real economy. Brunnermeier
(2009), Dwyer and Tkac (2009) and others document the evolution and spread of the
crisis and the role of subprime-mortgage backed securities in it.
The misperception and misevaluation of risk in structured financial products is
central to many explanations of the financial crisis. This may have arisen partly due to
the failure of some market participants to differentiate between the risk of AAA-rated
tranches of Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) and AAA-rated corporate bonds
(Brennan et al. 2009). In addition to possible mispricing, the valuation of CDO
tranches is particularly problematic in the event of widespread defaults (Smithson
2009), a feature not apparent before defaults increased in 2007. Valuation models
have four key inputs: default rates, prepayment risk, recovery rates and default
correlations. Problems estimating the last two were important during the financial
crisis. Default correlations inevitably are based on historical data and were under-
estimated based on a period of increasing house prices and economic expansion. As
default correlations increase, the probability of observing large-scale defaults also
increases, causing the prices of senior CDO tranches to fall. Estimates of recovery
rates were also affected. Consequently, the risk priced in the different CDO tranches
was underestimated. Coval et al. (2009) analyze the risk inherent in the securitization
process and in particular how risk migrates to higher-rated tranches in the event of
increasing importance of a large common shock such as falling house prices.
1 Dwyer and Tkac (2009) estimate that subprime mortgages are no more than one percent of global bond
values, stock values and bank deposits
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A better understanding of the factors underlying price changes in these subprime-
mortgage backed assets is important for understanding their role in the crisis. We
characterize the driving forces behind the decreases in these securities’ prices. In
earlier work, Longstaff and Rajan (2008) show that a theoretical pricing model for
CDOs can be represented as a three factor model, with common, credit rating and
idiosyncratic shocks. An empirical application using tranches of corporate credit
default swap indices (CDX) from 2003 to 2005 suggests that idiosyncratic default
risk accounts for around 65 % of the risk premium, while common risk accounts for
only 8 % of that premium. Extending the time period, Bhansali et al. (2008) show a
substantial increase in common-event risk in 2007 and 2008.
An additional but potentially key feature of subprime-mortgage backed indices is
variation in the quality of the underlying loans and collateral over time. Demyanyk
and Van Hemert’s (2011) analysis of subprime loans indicates a gradual and persistent
deterioration of loan quality from 2001 to 2007. To reflect this deterioration, we
extend Longstaff and Rajan’s (2008) empirical model to include a fourth factor, a
vintage factor. This vintage factor reflects risks associated with the dates the securities
were created. The model is applied to asset tranches of mortgage backed securities
using the Markit ABX.HE indices for three vintages over the period January 2006 to
December 2009. An innovation of this paper is the exploitation of the unbalanced
panel structure of the data to identify the vintage, credit, common and idiosyncratic
effects. This allows us to assess the contribution of all factors to the asset prices and
returns. We specify the model in state-space form and estimate it with a Kalman filter.
The ABX.HE data have been examined in several studies of the financial crisis.
Fender and Scheicher (2009) use two vintages to track the crisis and find that
increased liquidity risk and decreasing risk appetite were important factors in the
price decreases of the higher-rated tranches. Our paper differs in many respects; we
extract risk factors differently and focus on the level rather than the change of the
common factor. Longstaff (2010) uses the ABX indices to test for contagion from the
subprime-asset backed market to other parts of the financial system. He finds strong
evidence of contagion and liquidity risk with revisions to risk premia identified as the
most likely transmission channel. Longstaff also finds that ABX returns lead stock
market returns and bond yield changes by up to 3 weeks, suggesting that significant
information was uncovered in this market that led to subsequent price changes in
other markets. Gorton (2009) finds that declines in the ABX indices and the repo
market were highly correlated due to some combination of counterparty risk and lack
of liquidity.
Our results summarize the behaviour of subprime-mortgage backed securities in
terms of four factors. In 2006, all factors have a discernible role in asset returns. The
common factor becomes more important when the financial turmoil begins and has a
larger effect on AAA tranches than in the pre-crisis period. We examine the common
factor’s relationship with observable factors including real estate prices, the VIX
index and interest rate spreads which reflect the financial crisis. We find that liquidity
and counterparty risk, as represented by the spread between the London Interbank
Borrowing Rate (LIBOR) and the Overnight Index Swap (OIS) rate, is sufficient to
characterize the relationship between the common factor and the financial crisis as
reflected in interest rate spreads. We undertake a counterfactual analysis of the
evolution of the common factor if the LIBOR-OIS spread had remained at pre-
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crisis levels throughout. We estimate that the common factor is 20 % lower at the end
of 2009 than it would have been if LIBOR-OIS had not been elevated during the
financial crisis. Likewise we estimate that the actual value of the REIT index is about
40 % lower and VIX some 50 % higher than in the simulated model with a stable
interest rate spread. The decreases in the common factor, decreases in the REIT index
and increases of VIX are the estimated effects of the elevated values of LIBOR-OIS
during the crisis, not effects of lower housing prices.2
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the ABX data and high-
lights its unique features which are reflected in the econometric model presented in
2 A REIT index is included with the common factor in a cointegrating vector in order to reflect the
stochastic trend in housing prices.
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Fig. 1 ABX indices by vintage. This figure shows the levels of the Markit ABX indices of Collateralized
Debt Obligations based on subprime mortgages. The data are from Haver Analytics. The vintages are
January 2006 (06-1), July 2006 (06-2), January 2007 (07-1) and July 2007 (07-2). No indices have been
created subsequently. The premium is set on the indices to have an initial value of 100 based on a survey of
market participants, unless that premium is over 500 basis points in which case the premium is 500 basis
points. The initial trading values were less than 100 for lower rated tranches in the January 2007 vintage
and for the July 2007 vintages
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Section 3. The estimates of the factors are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 relates the
common factor to observable short-term fixed-income spreads. Section 6 concludes.
2 Tracking the Market for Subprime Mortgages
The price decreases in asset backed securities during the financial difficulties of 2007
to 2009 were dramatic. They represent declines in the values of the underlying assets
but probably also reassessments of the risks and liquidity of such assets. We analyze
the risk factors inherent in these tranched pools by examining the relatively new
indices of CDOs used as the basis for credit default swaps related to subprime-
mortgage backed securities. These indices, entitled ABX.HE, were introduced in
January 2006 by Markit and are widely used by market participants to track the
market for subprime mortgages and to bet on it.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the indices from January 2006 to December 31,
2009. Each issue is subdivided into five tranches, varying from AAA to BBB-, where
the ratings are the lower of those issued by Moody’s and S&P. The index values are
derived from underlying credit default swaps with the insurance coupon fixed for the life
of trading. The coupon is set so the index trades at par - 100 - at inception unless such a
coupon exceeds 500 basis points, in which case the coupon is set at 500 basis points.
Each vintage of the index is based on twenty mortgage backed CDO deals created
within the previous 6 months. For example, the ABX.HE 06-1 index is constructed
from deals created in the second half of 2005. The issuers are the largest originators.3
Strict requirements must be met to qualify for inclusion in the index. For example, the
value of each deal must be at least $500 million and each tranche must have an
average life between 4 and 6 years, and the AAA tranche must have a weighted
average life of more than 5 years. Furthermore, no security originator can have more
than four deals included.
New indices were created every 6 months from January 2006 to July 2007. No indices
have been created since then because there are too few new CDOs meeting the eligibility
requirements.4 New indices every 6 months with similar underlying securities might
have created an index that could be spliced together as is done sometimes with on-
the-run bonds and futures prices. Each vintage represents quite different risks though.
At least part of the explanation for these vintage effects is an increase in the riskiness
of the underlying mortgages (Demyanyk and Van Hemert 2011). This increase in risk
is reflected in increased coupon rates for insurance on the ABX indices from 2006 to
2007. Figure 1 shows substantial heterogeneity in the index values across vintages
from 2006 to the end of 2009 with later values declining more, which is consistent
with the mortgages being riskier. These considerations suggest that successive rolls of
the ABX are not suitable for splicing to create a continuous series, as Longstaff and
Rajan (2008) do for CDX data. Instead, each new index is best viewed as a unique
vintage with the risk of the underlying pool of assets different between vintages.
3 Licensed dealers in the ABX.HE indices included ABN AMRO, Bank of America, Barclays Capital, Bear
Stearns, BNP Paribas, Calyon, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan,
Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, RBS Greenwich, UBS and Wachovia.
4 As of this writing in 2012, there has been very little securitization since 2008.
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Our initial analysis extracts a common factor from the behaviour of daily ABX
returns. These “returns” on the ABX are the differences in the logarithms of the
indices. Descriptive statistics for each tranche of each vintage are given in Table 1.
The data set is unbalanced; all vintages exist at the end of the period but the vintages
are created over time. Within each vintage, the standard deviation of returns is lowest
for the AAA security. The first vintage has returns with the lowest volatility and there
is some evidence of higher standard deviations of returns for later vintages. The
distributions are negatively skewed with the exception of the AAA tranche of the
final vintage. All assets display excess kurtosis. This is greatest for the first vintage,
possibly reflecting the sustained low-variance period at the start of the period.
Tables 2 and 3 present correlations of the returns across credit ratings for given
vintages and across vintages for given credit ratings. The correlations of the AAA
tranches with other tranches decrease monotonically as ratings decline. The
Table 1 Summary statistics for asset returns by vintage
Rating Mean Standard
deviation
Minimum Maximum Skewness Excess
kurtosis
Number of
observations
Vintage 06-1
AAA −0.0002 0.0091 −0.082 0.076 −0.842 18.900 990
AA −0.0011 0.0191 −0.140 0.143 −0.180 13.518 990
A −0.0022 0.0213 −0.132 0.105 −0.421 7.575 990
BBB −0.0031 0.0218 −0.206 0.107 −2.905 22.872 990
BBB- −0.0031 0.0201 −0.187 0.112 −1.822 14.126 990
Vintage 06-2
AAA −0.0009 0.0168 −0.082 0.114 −0.397 6.924 865
AA −0.0026 0.0222 −0.110 0.134 −0.324 6.256 865
A −0.0035 0.0246 −0.172 0.105 −1.043 7.085 865
BBB −0.0035 0.0241 −0.134 0.177 −0.261 7.573 865
BBB- −0.0035 0.0237 −0.112 0.116 −0.059 4.074 865
Vintage 07-1
AAA −0.0014 0.0211 −0.114 0.139 −0.061 6.710 739
AA −0.0043 0.0261 −0.156 0.101 −0.868 5.265 739
A −0.0046 0.0282 −0.189 0.093 −0.893 5.269 739
BBB −0.0045 0.0261 −0.185 0.105 −0.858 5.686 739
BBB- −0.0045 0.0249 −0.181 0.092 −0.875 5.201 739
Vintage 07-2
AAA −0.0017 0.0227 −0.104 0.139 0.057 6.093 613
AA −0.0049 0.0278 −0.140 0.148 −0.888 5.843 613
A −0.0047 0.0260 −0.142 0.091 −0.623 3.517 613
BBB −0.0046 0.0247 −0.199 0.086 −1.217 8.121 613
BBB- −0.0044 0.0248 −0.156 0.090 −0.871 4.906 613
This table presents summary statistics for all vintages and all ratings of the ABX index for all dates from
inception to December 31, 1999. The left-skewness and excess kurtosis of the returns for all vintages and
ratings is evident
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correlations across vintages are highest for the AAA tranches but this is not partic-
ularly surprising because they bear less idiosyncratic risk than lower-rated tranches.
Table 2 Correlations of returns across credit ratings with vintages
Rating AAA AA A BBB BBB- AAA AA A BBB BBB-
Vintage 06-1 Vintage 06-2
AAA 1 1
AA .833 1 .599 1
A .492 .594 1 .396 .638 1
BBB .381 .415 .649 1 .220 .435 .581 1
BBB- .395 .428 .595 .837 1 .190 .402 .509 .740 1
Vintage 07-1 Vintage 07-2
AAA 1 1
AA .571 1 .605 1
A .300 .550 1 .399 .646 1
BBB .257 .412 .527 1 .287 .507 .481 1
BBB- .284 .398 .464 .827 1 .242 .455 .458 .841 1
Correlations include all vintages and ratings available. The data for each vintage uses all data available for
computing the correlations across credit ratings
Table 3 Correlations of returns across vintages within credit ratings
Vintage 06-1 06-2 07-1 07-2 06-1 06-2 07-1 07-2
AAA credit rating AA credit rating
06-1 1 1
06-2 .869 1 .604 1
07-1 .815 .888 1 .506 .711 1
07-2 .812 .865 .932 1 .503 .675 .785 1
A credit rating BBB credit rating
06-1 1 1
06-2 .631 1 .514 1
07-1 .480 .584 1 .461 .601 1
07-2 .549 .586 .561 1 .477 .497 .481 1
BBB- credit rating
06-1 1
06-2 .508 1
07-1 .523 .565 1
07-2 .432 .418 .471 1
This table shows the simple correlations of returns for all available vintages and ratings for the ABX
indices. The tables use the maximum number of observations possible to compute each correlation. For
example, the correlation of the AAA tranches of the January 2006 vintage and the July 2006 vintage uses
all observations for which data are available for both vintages. Similarly, the correlation of the AAA
tranches of the January 2006 vintage and the January 2007 vintage uses all observations for which data are
available for both vintages
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3 Modelling Framework for ABX Data
Financial market returns are frequently modelled with latent factor models, for
example by Diebold and Nerlove (1989) and Dungey and Martin (2007). In this
paper, we include four factors reflecting vintage effects in addition to the
common, credit rating and idiosyncratic factors present in Longstaff and Rajan
(2008). The explicit differences in ratings and vintages and the unbalanced
nature of the data allow us to identify these four factors from the data rather
than applying factor labels ex post. The model is
yi;j;t ¼ bi;jwt þ θi;jvi;t þ 8 i;jkj;t þ fi;jfi;j;t ð1Þ
where yi,j,t is the demeaned return on the ABX index of vintage i and credit
rating j at time t. The vintage is the date of issuance of the security. The factors
represent a common shock affecting all assets, wt; a vintage shock unique to all assets
of a particular index date, vi,t; a ratings shock unique to assets of a specific rating
across all vintages, kj,t; and idiosyncratic shocks, fi,j,t.
To capture serial correlation in the data, the common, ratings and vintage factors
follow AR(1) processes. As in previous research on factor models (Dungey et al.
2000), we do not estimate persistence in the idiosyncratic shocks. The additional
features of the model can be written
wt ¼ ρwwt1 þ ηwt ð2Þ
vi;t ¼ ρv;ivi;t1 þ ηv;i;t ð3Þ
kj;t ¼ ρk;jkj;t1 þ ηk;j;t ð4Þ
fi;j;t ¼ ηi;j;t ð5Þ
E ηw;t
  ¼ 0;E ηw;tηw;s
  ¼ σ2w ð6Þ
E ηz;t
  ¼ 0;E ηz;tηz;s
  ¼ σ2z for t ¼ s for z ¼ v; ið Þ; k; jð Þ; i; jð Þ ð7Þ
E ηz;tηz;s
  ¼ 0 for t 6¼ s for z ¼ v; ið Þ; k; jð Þ; f ; i; jð Þ ð8Þ
E ηz;tηa;t
  ¼ 0 for a; z ¼ v; ið Þ; k; jð Þ; f ; i; jð Þ and a 6¼ z ð9Þ
where equations (6) to (9) indicate that the shocks to each factor are independent
with constant variances. There are no other restrictions on the variance-covariance
matrix of the returns. The conditional variances of the returns vary over time and we
account for this feature of the data. Our state space model is already heavily
parameterized and it is impractical to include ARCH estimation directly into the
estimation of the factor model. Instead, we pre-filter the returns by estimating an
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IGARCH(1,1) model and use the standardized returns in the factor model.5 If we let
yi,j,t represent these standardized returns and ri,j,t represent the raw (unstandardized)
returns, then
ri;j;t ¼ ai;j þ hi;j;tyi;j;t ð10Þ
h2i;j;t ¼ g1;i;j ri;j;t1  ai;j
 2 þ 1 g1;i;j
 
h2i;j;t1:
Table 4 Estimates of IGARCH models
Estimated parameter Rating
AAA AA A BBB BBB-
Vintage 06-1
Constant −0.00004 0.00003 0.00015 −0.00154 0.00010
Standard error of constant 0.00001 0.00004 0.00006 0.00052 0.00020
IGARCH term (γ1) 0.1829 0.1746 0.1835 0.1873 0.0988
Standard error of γ1 0.0333 0.0311 0.0180 0.0455 0.0143
Vintage 06-2
Constant −0.00042 0.00005 0.00002 −0.00190 0.00037
Standard error of constant 0.00064 0.00008 0.00006 0.00067 0.00118
IGARCH term (γ1) 0.1438 0.1993 0.2000 0.1908 0.1029
Standard error of γ1 0.0565 0.0423 0.0200 0.0406 0.0235
Vintage 07-1
Constant 0.00019 0.00018 −0.00080 −0.00280 −0.00240
Standard error of constant 0.00012 0.00017 0.00064 0.00097 0.00086
IGARCH term (γ1) 0.1294 0.1650 0.1584 0.1472 0.1280
Standard error of γ1 0.0178 0.0330 0.0286 0.0646 0.0356
Vintage 07-2
Constant 0.00077 −0.00090 −0.00218 −0.00299 0.00196
Standard error of constant 0.00100 0.00186 0.00149 0.00105 0.00063
IGARCH term (γ1) 0.1044 0.0943 0.1370 0.1249 0.1528
Standard error of γ1 0.0288 0.0879 0.0344 0.2062 0.0392
The parameters are estimates of the IGARCH equations for the returns ri,j,t
ri,j,t0ai,j+hi,j,t yi,j,t
h2i;j;t ¼ g1 ri;j;t1  ai;j
 2 þ 1 g1ð Þh2i;j;t1
where hi,j,t is the conditional standard deviation of ri,j,t and yi,j,t is the innovation in the return with zero
mean and unit standard deviation. The table presents estimate parameters for all vintages and ratings
5 Prefiltering the data may result in inefficiency in the second stage of estimation. The consistency of the
estimates is unaffected by two-stage estimation if the estimators are orthogonal, which seems a strong
assumption in our application. We do not focus on statistical significance of parameters and our analysis of
the factors uses estimates of the factors with the filtering reversed.
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Table 4 presents the parameter estimates of the IGARCH models estimated
by Quasi Maximum Likelihood for all credit ratings and vintages (Lumsdaine
1996). Table 5 presents summary statistics for the adjusted returns and Fig. 2
shows the adjusted returns. The graphs suggest that the IGARCH model has
stabilized the variances relative to the variances in the original series.
The factor model can be rewritten in state-space form as
Yt ¼ Zat þ S"t ð11Þ
atþ1 ¼ Yat þ Rut ð12Þ
where Yt is the vector of the returns in each asset, E "t½  ¼ 0;E "t"0t
  ¼ H ;E ut½  ¼ 0 ,
Table 5 Summary statistics for standardized asset returns by vintage
Rating Mean Standard
deviation
Minimum Maximum Skewness Excess
kurtosis
Number of
7observations
Vintage 06-1
AAA −0.0876 1.3641 −17.798 8.473 −3.154 36.585 990
AA −0.1067 1.2440 −8.002 8.614 −0.390 8.506 990
A −0.1400 1.1693 −5.923 8.292 0.157 7.038 990
BBB −0.1622 1.1564 −7.056 12.827 0.628 21.347 990
BBB- −0.1763 1.1378 −7.586 8.337 −0.342 8.594 990
Vintage 06-2
AAA −0.0914 1.2205 −14.639 6.579 −3.169 32.124 865
AA −0.1318 1.2739 −7.652 9.679 −0.221 9.370 865
A −0.1721 1.2027 −6.222 8.327 −0.196 5.180 865
BBB −0.1919 1.1811 −7.203 10.417 −0.083 12.605 865
BBB- −0.1968 1.1343 −7.596 8.413 −0.188 10.112 865
Vintage 07-1
AAA −0.0880 1.1743 −8.911 6.014 −1.204 8.870 739
AA −0.1304 1.2057 −6.191 8.190 −0.038 7.982 739
A −0.1799 1.1484 −5.534 7.661 −0.130 4.624 739
BBB −0.2088 1.1617 −7.109 7.017 −0.847 7.442 739
BBB- −0.2073 1.1368 −8.470 5.421 −0.998 6.931 739
Vintage 07-2
AAA −0.0699 1.1123 −7.825 4.898 −1.015 7.171 613
AA −0.1178 1.1359 −5.960 8.358 0.071 8.795 613
A −0.1693 1.1197 −5.268 6.843 −0.010 4.147 613
BBB −0.1958 1.1379 −6.832 6.508 −1.024 8.218 613
BBB- −0.1807 1.1287 −7.404 6.462 −0.535 7.060 613
This table shows summary statistics for the returns standardized for the IGARCH in the raw returns. There
still is skewness and excess kurtosis, although generally quite a bit less than in the raw returns
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and E utu
0
t
  ¼ Q . The evolving latent factors are contained in the vector αt and the
idiosyncratic factors, fi,j,t are contained in the vector εt.
To reduce the dimensionality of the estimation problem and keep it tracta-
ble, our empirical estimation is based on a system of nine asset returns
selected to span the range of ratings and vintages. We examine AAA, AA
and BBB- rated securities from the January 2006, January 2007 and July 2007
vintages. The AAA and AA tranches have the largest share of the value of
underlying subprime-mortgage bonds, and the BBB- tranche is included be-
cause it is the lowest rated tranche. We include the January 2006 and July
2007 vintages because they are the first and last issuances available. We prefer
the January 2007 vintage to the July 2006 vintage mainly because the January
2007 vintage is based on later mortgages. These mortgages may have been less
carefully vetted when created and may be affected more by the decline in
housing prices and mortgages subsequently becoming upside down.
The following definitions of Z and αt show the form of the restrictions in the
model,
Z ¼
b1;AAA θ1;AAA 0 0 φ1;AAA 0 0
b1;AA θ1;AA 0 0 0 φ1;AA 0
b1;BBB θ1;BBB 0 0 0 0 φ1;BBB
b2;AAA 0 θ2;AAA 0 φ2;AAA 0 0
b2;AA 0 θ2;AA 0 0 φ2;AA 0
b2;BBB 0 θ2;BBB 0 0 0 φ2;BBB
b3;AAA 0 0 θ3;AAA φ3;AAA 0 0
b3;AA 0 0 θ3;AA 0 φ3;AA 0
b3;BBB 0 0 θ3;BBB 0 0 φ3;BBB
2
6666666666664
3
7777777777775
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Fig. 2 Returns adjusted for IGARCH. These are the returns adjusted for IGARCH(1,1) based on the
estimates in Table 4. The “06-1” vintage is the January 2006 vintage; the “07-1” vintage is the January
vintage; the “07-2” vintage is the July 2007 vintage. The seemingly near-zero variances are periods of
relatively low volatility
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at ¼
wt
v1;t
v2;t
v3;t
kAAA;t
kAA;t
kBBB;t
2
666666664
3
777777775
ð14Þ
Defining Υ as a 7×7 diagonal matrix of autoregressive parameters, ρ0[ρw ρv,i ρk,j]
for all i,j; St as a 9×9 matrix with parameters φi,j on the main diagonal; and R as the
appropriately sized identity matrix where the factor variances are standardized to
unity, we can estimate the parameters by the standard Kalman filter procedure.6 Its
prediction equations are given by
atþ1 ¼ Υatjt ð15Þ
1vt ð16Þ
Ptþ1jt ¼ ΥPtjtΥ0 þ SQS 0 ð16Þ
where Ptþ1jt is the prediction vector. The updating equations are
atjt ¼ at þ PtZ 0F1t vt ð17Þ
Ptjt ¼ Pt  PtZ 0F1t ZP
0
t ð18Þ
Where
vt ¼ Yt  Zat ð19Þ
Ft ¼ ZPtZ 0 þ Z ð20Þ
Furthermore, we accommodate the unbalanced nature of our data by constructing a
dummy matrix, Dt, as follows
Dt ¼
1 1 0 0 1 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 1
d1t 0 d1t 0 d1t 0 0
d1t 0 d1t 0 0 d1t 0
d1t 0 d1t 0 0 0 d1t
d2t 0 0 d2t d2t 0 0
d2t 0 0 d2t 0 d2t 0
d2t 0 0 d2t 0 0 d2t
2
6666666666664
3
7777777777775
ð21Þ
6 Starting values are taken as the consistent estimates of the parameters of the factor model in equation (1)
obtained from unconditional moments using GMM.
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where d1t takes the value of 1 from the initiation of the 07-1 vintage onwards and 0
otherwise and d2t is similarly defined with respect to the vintage 07-2. The Kalman
filter equations are then modified by replacing Z with Z∘Dt wherever it appears in the
filter with the operator ∘ indicating element-by-element multiplication.
4 Results
A preliminary yet informative way to analyze the results is to perform an uncondi-
tional variance decomposition using equation (1) which implies
Var yi;j
  ¼ b2i;jVarðwÞ þ θ2i;jVar við Þ þ φ2i;jVar kj
 þ f2i;jVar fi;j
  ð22Þ
so that, for example, the contribution of the vintage factor to variance in asset yi,j is
expressed as
θ2i;jVar við Þ
b2i;jVarðwÞ þ θ2i;jVar við Þ þ φ2i;jVar kj
 þ f2i;jVar fi;j
 
and similarly for other contributing factors.
Table 6 presents the unconditional variance decomposition for the full period of
each vintage and for selected subperiods.7 For the full period, the common factor is
most important for the AAA and AA ratings for all vintages. Variability of the BBB-
tranches is less closely related to the common factor and more closely related to the
rating factor. The vintage factors are relatively unimportant for all assets. The ratings
factors, on the other hand, affect all of the vintages and credit ratings, although they
are less important for the AA tranches of the January and July 2007 vintages. The
importance of idiosyncratic factors differs across vintages and across ratings. In
particular, they exert a stronger influence on later vintages and we also observe an
upward drift in terms of ratings over time. This likely reflects the losses and
consequent collapse in prices for the lower-rated tranches of the later vintages, which
decimated the protection for the higher-rated tranches. As a result of the large losses,
idiosyncratic losses on mortgages migrate up to the AA and even the AAA tranches.
Table 6 also presents the unconditional variance decompositions for subperiods. In
the non-crisis period of 2006, the variances of the AAA and AA tranches are
dominated by the common factor and the credit rating factors. The idiosyncratic
factor is easily the most important factor for the BBB- tranche and is quite unimpor-
tant for the higher-rated tranches. This is consistent with the role of the BBB- tranche
as the absorber of the relatively small idiosyncratic losses. The common shock
accounts for about half the variance of the AAA and AA tranches. This contrasts
with Longstaff and Rajan’s (2008) finding that a common factor is relatively unim-
portant in non-crisis periods. The first half of 2007 does not look markedly different
for these securities. There are however differences in the relative importance of the
factors for the January 2007 vintage. The AAA securities look little different, but the
7 The parameter values themselves are estimated consistently, but are not very informative by themselves.
The parameter values are available from the authors upon request.
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idiosyncratic factor becomes quite a bit more important for the AA securities, roughly
the same as for the BBB- tranche of the January 2006 vintage.
In the crisis from July 2007 to the end of 2008, the relative contributions of the
factors change markedly. The common factor is most important for the AAA-rated
tranches of all vintages. For the BBB- tranches, idiosyncratic factors remain prom-
inent although the common factor exerts more influence and the ratings factors
assume most importance. Idiosyncratic factors remain most important for the BBB-
tranche in the January 2006 vintage, though, as well as for the AA tranches of the
January and July 2007 vintages. Vintage factors, never especially important, all but
disappear.
Table 6 Average contribution of factors to variance in returns for subperiods
Factor/Vintage And rating January 2006 January 2007 July 2007
AAA AA BBB- AAA AA BBB- AAA AA BBB-
Start of each vintage to December 2009
Common .49 .62 .24 .58 .32 .29 .55 .47 .32
Vintage .05 .02 .01 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
Credit rating .43 .35 .39 .40 .11 .52 .33 .15 .63
Idiosyncratic .03 .01 .37 .03 .57 .19 .38 .38 .05
January 2006 to December 2006
Common .43 .50 .21
Vintage .08 .03 .00
Credit rating .45 .46 .29
Idiosyncratic .03 .01 .50
January 2007 to June 2007
Common .37 .50 .18 .47 .30 .24
Vintage .13 .09 .00 .00 .00 .00
Credit rating .46 .40 .41 .50 .22 .57
Idiosyncratic .04 .01 .41 .03 .48 .19
July 2007 to December 2008
Common .53 .71 .26 .59 .32 .30 .55 .46 .33
Vintage .02 .01 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
Credit rating .42 .28 .43 .38 .08 .51 .33 .14 .62
Idiosyncratic .03 .00 .32 .03 .60 .19 .12 .41 .05
January 2009 to December 2009
Common .57 .70 .27 .62 .34 .30 .58 .48 .32
Vintage .02 .01 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
Credit rating .39 .29 .45 .35 .10 .53 .31 .16 .64
Idiosyncratic .02 .00 .28 .02 .56 .17 .11 .36 .04
The first panel of the table shows the variance decompositions for each of the vintages from the inception of
each vintage until the end of 2009. The second panel shows the variance decompositions for a period
clearly before the financial crisis, 2006. The second panel shows the variance decomposition for the first
half of 2007. The third panel shows the variance decomposition for the period most evidently one of
financial crisis and the fourth panel shows developments in 2009
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In 2009, there is little evidence of any return to pre-crisis factor contributions. The
variance decompositions are hard to distinguish from those of the crisis period. This
analysis reveals substantial time variation in the relative factor contributions to ABX
returns.
Figure 3 shows daily variance decompositions for each vintage and credit rating.
Each panel has 3 columns, representing AAA, AA and BBB- rated assets respective-
ly. The first row in each panel presents the observed asset return volatility, and the
following rows present the contributions of each factor to that volatility. Note that the
common factor, shown in the second row, tends to be more important for the higher-
rated tranches and the idiosyncratic factor tends to be more important for lower-rated
assets. It is important to note that this is the variance decomposition for the standard-
ized returns, not the raw returns. We discuss each of the factors in turn before delving
more deeply into the relationship between the common factor with observables.
4.1 The Common Factor
The second row of Fig. 3 shows the common factor becoming increasingly
important over time compared with other factors. Its influence is negligible during
the relatively tranquil conditions that characterized the financial system before early
2007. This is consistent with relatively low default correlations during this period and
the low credit default spreads demanded for protection against default of the pooled
assets. For example, the spread for the AAA tranche of the first vintage was a mere 18
basis points, falling to 9 bps for the January 2007 vintage and finally increasing to
76 bps for the last vintage. The low realization of the common shock in the early
period compared to the crisis period contributed to claims that credit rating agencies,
and some market participants, under-estimated risk. Brennan et al. (2009) show that if
investors rely exclusively on rating agencies to accurately assess creditworthiness,
this can lead to mispricing of CDOs’ (and similar products’) tranches.8
As the crisis emerges in mid-2007, the contribution of the common shock to asset
volatility increases noticeably. Its pervasive nature affects all assets in the underlying
pool and thus heightens their pairwise correlations. These increased levels of
comovement quickly eroded the buffer protecting the AAA tranche and in relative
terms implies investors in these assets were worst hit by the common shock. This is
consistent with the argument of Coval et al. (2009) that an amplified common shock
effectively transfers risk from lower to more senior tranches. From mid-2007 on-
wards, the common factor swamps all other factors, suggesting that all AAA-rated
assets behaved increasingly alike without any distinguishing vintage effects.
A number of other studies document a similar pattern for systematic shocks in
different asset markets. Eichengreen et al. (2009) analyze CDS spreads of 45 inter-
national financial institutions and document an increasing role for a common factor as
the financial crisis evolves, with its largest influence in the aftermath of the Lehman
collapse. Similarly, Longstaff and Myers (2009) show that a common factor can
explain a substantial proportion of bank and CDO equity return variation.
8 Classens et al. (2010) argue that many investors actually did rely totally on credit ratings.
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ab
Fig. 3 Variance decomposition.
This figure shows the daily vari-
ance decomposition for each
vintage and credit rating within
each vintage. The first row of
each panel shows squared stan-
dardized returns. The following
rows in the panel show the con-
tributions by the common factor,
the corresponding vintage factor,
the corresponding ratings factor
and the idiosyncratic factor. The
vertical scales of the graphs dif-
fer vertically but not horizontally.
The vertical scales differ too
much to use the same scale for all
graphs. Comparisons across
credit ratings within a vintage are
simpler with the same scale for
all three credit ratings
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4.2 Ratings and Vintage Factors
Both the rating and vintage factors exert a time-varying influence on asset return
variability. At various times, the specific rating and vintage helped to differentiate
between assets. For the earliest vintage, 06-1, ratings matter and this factor accounts
for a non-trivial amount of asset return variability. For later vintages, ratings matter
little for the two most senior tranches but continue to be an important determinant of
returns for the equity tranche. In relative terms the contribution of the vintage factor is
the smallest of all factors. However, in early 2007 as ABS markets become unsettled,
the vintage factor has a pronounced effect. This suggests that market participants
began to distinguish between ABX indices on the basis of the underlying asset
quality. For all tranches the largest impact of the vintage factor occurs for the July
2007 issuance. The deals underlying this issue were struck in the first half of 2007,
when US house price declines were already evident (previous issues were based on
rising and then peak house prices).
The rating and vintage factors play an important role in distinguishing assets
during non-crisis periods. However, during crisis, their influence is swamped by
the common and idiosyncratic components.
4.3 The Idiosyncratic Factor
Just as the common factor exerts its greatest influence on the most senior claim,
idiosyncratic shocks have their greatest effect at the other end of the rating spectrum.
In the earliest vintage, idiosyncratic risk almost exclusively affects the BBB- tranche
Fig. 3 (continued)
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and were of little concern to holders of more senior claims because the lower-rated
tranches absorbed these risks. In later vintages, there is a greater role for idiosyncratic
shocks as mezzanine tranches also exhibit some vulnerability to them, most likely due
to the inadequacy of the equity tranches to protect them. Interestingly, idiosyncratic
shocks fall in importance for BBB- rated assets, which may be due to overwhelming
influence of the common shock or may also reflect a lack of trades when the value of
the BBB- tranche flattened out near zero.9
The behaviour of the idiosyncratic shock is consistent with the arguments outlined
earlier. In normal market conditions, when assets in the underlying pool exhibited
relatively low correlation, idiosyncratic risk resulted in a few random subprime
mortgage defaults whose effects were absorbed by the equity tranche or other
lower-rated tranches. The onset of the crisis in July 2007 led to this risk source being
swamped by the common shock, limiting its impact on asset return volatility.
5 What Drives the Common Factor?
Initially, we recover the level of the common factor. The logarithm of the value of the
underlying asset, pi,j,t, for vintage i, credit rating j, in period t, from the adjusted
return, yi,j,t, accounting for GARCH is
pi;j;t ¼ aþ hi;j;tyi;j;t þ pi;j;t1 ð23Þ
by the definition of the return and the equation for conditional heteroskedasticity (10).
The relationship between this index value and the factors can be seen by substituting
for yi,j,t to write
pi;j;t ¼ aþ hi;j;t bi;jwt þ θi;jvi;t þ φi;jkj;t þ fi;jfi;j;t
 
þ pi;j;t1 ð24Þ
The contribution of the factors to the value of the assets can then be written as
pi;j;t ¼ aþ bi;jhi;j;twt þ θi;jhi;j;tvi;t þ φi;jhi;j;tkj;t þ fi;jhi;j;t fi;j;t þ pi;j;t1 ð25Þ
where βi,j hi,j,t wt is the contribution of the common factor to the value of the asset
with vintage i and rating j in period t. Note that the common factor including
heteroskedasticity is different for each tranche and vintage because different condi-
tional standard deviations translate the adjusted returns into raw returns.
Section 4 showed that the common factor plays a major part in changes to
the values of the most senior tranches of subprime-mortgage backed assets.
We focus the rest of our analysis on the drivers of the common factor. We
use the AAA tranche of the 06-1 vintage to construct the level of the
common factor hi,j,t wt because it represents the highest valued CDO tranche for
the longest period.10 Fig. 4 shows the integrated common factor with its level set to
9 The buyer of insurance in the CDS on the CDO makes an initial payment to the insurance seller equal to
the difference between 100 and the index value. When the index is near zero, this becomes a substantial
unsecured loan.
10 For example, Hu (2007) reports that for CDOs issued in 2006, AAA-rated assets accounted for 85 % of
dollar value and 36 % of the number of tranches, while the figures for Baa and lower rated assets were
3.7 % and 24 % respectively. Many deals had more than one AAA tranche. The ABX index is based on the
most subordinate AAA tranche.
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unity at the start of the series.11 The evolution of the common factor can be usefully
compared to that of the AAA tranche of the ABX index for January 2006, both of
which are shown in Fig. 4 for convenience. Consistent with the common factor’s
substantial importance in the evolution of the AAA tranches, the common factor
reflects many of the characteristics of the AAA tranche.
Observable economic variables potentially related to the deterioration of the ABX
are real estate prices, general financial market volatility and liquidity and counter-
party risk. We use the logarithm of a daily price index for the U.S. real estate trusts
(REITs) represented by the Dow Jones Equity All REIT Index to reflect news about
housing prices; and the logarithm of the VIX index as a measure of general financial
market volatility.
Liquidity and counterparty default risk are measured by three one-month interest
rate spreads: the spread between the London Interbank Borrowing Rate (LIBOR) and
the overnight index swap rate (OIS), LIBOR-OIS; the spread between LIBOR and the
U.S. Treasury Bill rate, the TED spread; and the spread between the commercial
paper rate and the U.S. Treasury Bill rate, CPR-TB.
LIBOR-OIS can be viewed as reflecting counterparty risk from the standpoint of a
lender to another institution. Borrowers who believe the market is overstating their
risk may also view this spread as reflecting liquidity. The TED spread is another
common measure of liquidity and counterparty risk and would be partly redundant
with the inclusion of LIBOR-OIS. The spread between OIS and the Treasury Bill rate
(OIS-TB), which excludes the part of the TED spread already represented by LIBOR-
OIS, provides a straightforward means of examining the informativeness of one
spread relative to the other. OIS-TB is the clearest indicator of liquidity issues
11 The contribution of the common factor to the measured return on the ABX is the common factor times its
coefficient of 0.83. The contribution of the level of the factor to the level of ABX though depends on an
unobserved initializing constant for the level of the common factor which cannot be recovered from first
difference alone.
The Integrated Common Factor 
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Fig. 4 The integrated common factor. The left panel shows the integrated common factor for the January
2006 AAA vintage with the initial value normalized to 1. This value reflects the conditionally hetero-
skedastic behavior of the common factor derived from the conditional heteroskedasticity in the original
returns. The right panel shows the actual value of the AAA tranche of the January 2006 vintage of the ABX
index. Many common features appear in both figures
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because the OIS rate is the rate for almost fully collateralized private transactions and
the Treasury Bill rate is a nominal risk-free rate. We also include the spread between
the commercial paper rate on AA-rated asset-backed commercial paper and the U.S.
Treasury bill rate, which can be interpreted as reflecting flights to quality during the
crisis due to concerns about the value of the underlying assets.
Figure 5 shows the observable factors. The figures clearly show evidence of
episodes with increasing and then decreasing spreads, most evidently for the CPR-
TB spread but also for the spread of LIBOR over OIS.
Unit root tests indicate one unit root in each of the common factor, REIT and VIX.
This unexpected outcome for the VIX is consistent with the results reported by Zhang
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Fig. 5 Observable variables. This figure shows the values of the variables other than the ABX index which are
included in the analysis of the variables’ relationships. The figures suggest that the Dow-Jones Equity All REIT
index and VIX have slow moving components, possibly unit roots, while the spreads do not. By the end of
2009, the spreads return to values similar to those before the crisis, although the behavior is not identical
Table 7 Cointegration tests and cointegrating vector
Cointegration rank tests
Number of cointegrating
vectors
Eigenvalue Trace statistic p-value Maximum eigenvalue
statistic
p-value
None 0.0423 57.768 <10−4 41.927 <10−4
At most 1 0.0132 15.841 0.1819 12.934 0.1381
At most 2 0.0030 2.9071 0.5982 2.907 0.5982
Cointegration vector
Level of
Variable Common factor REIT index VIX Constant
Coefficient 1 −0.5138 0.1386 1.5652
Standard Error 0.0651 0.0477 0.4767
The p-values are based on MacKinnon, Haug and Michelis (1999). The trace test and maximum eigenvalue
test lead to the same conclusion: one cointegrating vector among the three variables
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et al. (2010) for options prices. Johansen cointegration tests, reported in Table 7, are
consistent with one cointegrating vector between the common factor and the loga-
rithms of the Dow-Jones REIT index and VIX.
Table 8 presents a 3-variable Vector Error Correction Mechanism (VECM) for the
common factor, the logarithm of the REIT index and the logarithm of VIX. All
equations include two lags of all variables.12 One month interest-rate spreads for
LIBOR-OIS, OIS-TB, and CPR-TB are included as exogenous variables. The errors
are specified as a diagonal GARCH(1,1), estimated using a diagonal vech structure.
The zero restrictions on errors across variables reduce the number of parameters
estimated.13
Table 9 presents tests to restrict this set of equations by deleting spreads. The
results clearly indicate that LIBOR-OIS is very informative for these variables. The
results also clearly indicate that the CPR-TB is not informative and can be dropped at
little cost. The OIS-TB spread is somewhat informative, with a p-value of 10.3 % for
dropping it from the equations with both other spreads but a p-value of only 20.5 %
when the commercial paper rate spread is not included in the equations. Overall, the
results are consistent with the informativeness of the spread of LIBOR - OIS but not
the other spreads. Table 10 presents the estimated three-equation VECM with
LIBOR-OIS as the only spread. While t-ratios might suggest that LIBOR-OIS is
not uniformly important, likelihood ratio tests indicate that each of the variables
reflects movements in LIBOR-OIS.14
The estimates in Table 10 can be used as the basis for comparing actual events with
events estimated without the behaviour of LIBOR-OIS reflecting the financial crisis.
We infer the no-financial-turmoil behaviour of LIBOR-OIS from its behaviour prior
to the financial crisis. It is relatively simple to date the financial crisis in terms of
LIBOR-OIS. It spiked from 9.65 basis points on August 8, 2007 to 38.18 basis points
on August 9. This spike is extraordinary and not a random date. On August 9, 2007,
BNP Paribus suspended redemptions in three funds holding securities based on
subprime mortgages. Later that day, the European Central Bank and the Federal
Reserve dramatically increased repurchase agreements with banks to provide addi-
tional reserves to banks. From the inception of the ABX indices on January 19, 2006
to August 8, 2007, the mean LIBOR-OIS spread is 6.32 basis points with a standard
deviation of 1.38 basis points. The maximum spread is 11.95 basis points. For the rest
of our time period, the mean spread is 64.38 basis points with a standard deviation of
58.88 basis points; the maximum spread is 337.75 basis points on October 10, 2008.
As Fig. 5 shows, the LIBOR-OIS spread decreased from these extraordinary values.
From June 1, 2009 to the end of 2009, the mean spread is 9.87 basis points with a
standard deviation of 1.16 basis points, with a maximum of 12.95 basis points in
12 The choice of lag length is based on F-tests and Akaike Information Criterion values, reported in Table 9,
which support the reduction from 3 to 2 lags but not further. We also examined evidence for a VECMwhere
spreads are treated as exogenous. For LIBOR less OIS in a four-equation system, the p-value is 13.4 %. For
LIBOR less OIS in a five-equation system, the p-value is 13.7 %. These systems involve many parameters,
so these results are at best indicative. Attempts to estimate a six-variable system with the AA asset-backed
commercial paper rate were not successful.
13 Bauwens et al. (2006) and Silvennoinen and Teräsvirta (2008) review multivariate GARCH models.
14 The p-values for deleting the current and two lagged values of LIBOR-OIS are 0.01 %, 4.30 %, and
0.02 % for the common factor, the logarithm of the REIT index and for the logarithm of VIX equations
respectively.
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these 7 months. Even this slightly elevated level of LIBOR-OIS may well be a
reflection of the financial crisis.
While there always is variation in LIBOR-OIS, we simplify our simulation by
setting LIBOR-OIS to its average value before the financial crisis and impose that
value for the crisis period. We then simulate the behaviour of the common factor,
REIT and VIX using the same innovations to those three variables as derived from the
estimates in Table 10. If LIBOR-OIS were exactly the same as its historical values,
the actual values of the common factor, the REIT index and VIX would occur.
The simulation is ‘dynamic’ in the sense that values of the common factor, the
REIT index and VIX persist into subsequent periods, so that deviations of
simulated from actual values persist. The estimated VECM, of course, will
predict adjustment of the three variables in the cointegrating vector back to
the stable long-run relationship. This need not mean adjustment of the levels of
the variables back to their values before the financial crisis.
Figure 6 shows the actual and simulated values of the common factor, the REIT
index and VIX. By the end of 2009, all of the variables still show effects of the
financial crisis as reflected in LIBOR-OIS. None of the variables has returned to values
similar to their values before the financial crisis. The percentage deviations between the
actual values of the series – the common factor, the REIT stock price index and VIX –
are shown in Fig. 7. The deviations are substantial. At the end of 2009, the simulation
Table 9 Likelihood ratio tests of restrictions on error correction mechanism
Test Test statistic Degrees of freedom p-value
Lag Length
2 lags to 1 lag 32.118 18 0.0213
3 lags to 2 lags 11.906 18 0.8520
Conditional on other spreads in equations
Drop Libor-OIS 40.292 6 <10−4
Drop Libor-TB 10.568 6 0.1027
Drop CPR-TB 6.735 6 0.3461
Conditional on CPR-TB not in equations
Drop Libor-OIS 34.776 6 <10−4
Drop Libor-TB 8.478 6 0.2051
Conditional on CPR-TB and OIS-TB not in equations
Drop Libor-OIS 37.318 12 0.0002
Current Libor-OIS helps to predict all three variables
3-variable system 14.876 3 0.0019
In addition to the 3 underlying variables in the cointegrating vector error-correction mechanism – the
common factor, the reit stock price index and VIX – the variables included are Libor minus the overnight
index swap (OIS) rate, Libor minus the Treasury Bill rate (which can be represented by OIS minus the
Treasury Bill rate if Libor-OIS is included in the equations) and the AA commercial paper rate minus the
Treasury Bill rate. The tests for lag length are based on estimates of the VECM with lagged values of the
three spreads. The Akaike Information Criterion values are −17.9322, −17.9386 and −17.9241 for lag
lengths of three, two and one, leading to a choice of the same lag length as F-ratios. The last test examines
whether current values of Libor-OIS included in each of the three equations in the 3-variable ECM help to
predict the three variables
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Actual and Simulated Values 
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Fig. 6 Actual and simulated values of the common factor, REIT Index and VIX. This figure shows the actual
values of the integrated logarithm of the common factor, the logarithm of the Dow-Jones Equity All REIT index
and the logarithm of VIX. These actual values are shown on each graph with the simulated value from the
estimated vector error correction mechanism in Table 10. The simulated values are from a dynamic
simulation with LIBOR less OIS held to its mean value from January 19, 2006 to December 31, 2009
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Fig. 7 Deviations between actual and simulated values of the common factor, the REIT index and VIX. This
figure shows the percentage deviations between the actual and simulated values of the integrated common
factor, the Dow-Jones Equity All REIT index andVIX. The percentage deviations are between the actual values
and the exponentiated value of the logarithm of simulated values. The simulated values are from a dynamic
simulation with LIBOR less OIS held to its mean value from September 19, 2006 to August 8, 2007. The
deviation between the common factor and the simulated value shows a clear downward movement not reversed
by the end of 2009. The deviation between the REIT index and the simulated value show a similar downward
movement. The deviation between actual VIX and the simulated value shows a dramatic movement upward in
2008, much of which but not all is reversed by the last half of 2009
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shows that the common factor would have been 20 % higher if the LIBOR-OIS had
stayed close to its value before the financial crisis. Similarly, the REIT index is
slightly more than 40 % lower than it would have been under the simulation. In
contrast the VIX is over 50 % higher as a result of the LIBOR-OIS experiences than
in the simulation where LIBOR-OIS remained around its pre-crisis values.
Even if LIBOR-OIS returns to pre-crisis values, the cointegrated values of the
common factor, the REIT index and VIX need not return to their pre-crisis values
even though they will return to the cointegrated relationship. The estimated cointe-
grating vector suggests that it will take a long time for the variables to return to
equilibrium and that the shocks to LIBOR-OIS reflected in the common factor are
likely to have permanently changed this factor in the wake of the crisis.
6 Conclusion
We characterize the behaviour of the ABX indices of subprime-mortgage backed
assets during the Financial Crisis of 2007 and 2008. In the process, we gain a better
understanding of the sources of the decline of this market, in particular the falls due to
liquidity and counterparty risk. We apply a latent factor model to an unbalanced panel
of returns by credit rating and vintage to obtain a measure of the common movement.
The unbalanced nature of the data lends itself to identification of four factors from the
returns: a common factor, a vintage factor relating to the issuance dates of the
securities, a credit rating factor and an idiosyncratic factor.
All factors exert a time-varying influence on the volatility of asset returns. The
factor common to all tranches and vintages shows the most important change in
variation over time. The common factor’s influence on the highly rated tranches
increases with the financial crisis, although not dramatically. This is consistent with
market participants underpricing, and credit agencies underestimating, the coming
financial difficulties. This of course is easier to see now than before the crisis. Given
the structure of CDOs, the most senior tranches are quite vulnerable to the miscal-
culation of common risk. The increasing magnitude of common undiversifiable
shocks changes the return behaviour of AAA tranches dramatically as the crisis
unfolds. As a result, the demarcation between tranches becomes blurred as assets
within the underlying pool becoming increasingly correlated. Consequently, it is the
common shock that is most closely associated with the main damage to the values of
CDOs. As suggested by Coval et al. (2009), the securitization process led to more
vulnerability to common risk that had been unimportant during the low volatility
environment before 2007 but came to the fore with a vengeance during the subse-
quent downturn. At the other end of the spectrum, the role of idiosyncratic shocks in
determining asset returns is predominantly associated with the lowest rated tranche,
but even this is largely overwhelmed by the common factor after July 2007. Similarly,
in the earlier tranquil market conditions, both the ratings and vintage factors are
important for some tranches but again their influence is dwarfed by the common
factor during the financial crisis.
To estimate the effects of counterparty risk and liquidity difficulties in financial
markets, we delve deeper into the origins of the common factor. We relate the
common factor to observable variables commonly mentioned as being crucial in
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the initiation and transmission of the crisis, capturing the real estate downturn,
general financial market volatility, market liquidity decreases and increasing counter-
party risk. The common factor, the REIT index and VIX are cointegrated and related
to the LIBOR-OIS spread. The LIBOR-OIS spread played a critical role. Because the
spread was elevated during the crisis, at the end of 2009, the common factor was
20 % lower, the REIT index was 40 % lower and the VIX was 50 higher than without
the disruptions reflected in LIBOR-OIS. This of course does not imply that setting
LIBOR-OIS to pre-crisis values would have reduced the effect on the other variables.
Fixing a price cannot help. On the other hand, our results indicate that macropruden-
tial supervision is an even more difficult task than commonly thought. A financial
crisis has nontrivial effects that continue well after it is over.
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Appendix: Details on Data Series
The data series used in this paper are described below:
ABX Data, all from Bloomberg:
& ABX.HE-A 06-1: 0.54 % Coupon Closing Price, RED ID: 0A08AFAA7
& ABX.HE-A 07-1: 0.64 % Coupon Closing Price, RED ID: 0A08AFAC0
& ABX.HE-A 07-2: 3.69 % Coupon Closing Price, RED ID: 0A08AFAD8
& ABX.HE-AAA 06-1: 0.18 % Coupon Closing Price, RED ID:0A08AHAA1
& ABX.HE-AAA 07-1: 0.09 % Coupon Closing Price, RED ID:0A08AHAC6
& ABX.HE-AAA 07-2: 0.76 % Coupon Closing Price, RED ID:0A08AHAD4
& ABX.HE-BBB 06-1: 1.54 % Coupon Closing Price, RED ID:0A08AIAB6
& ABX.HE-BBB 07-1: 2.24 % Coupon Closing Price, RED ID: 0A08AIAC4
& ABX.HE-BBB 07-2: 5.00 % Coupon Closing Price, RED ID: 0A08AIAD2
Other series:
& US Real estate sector price index - Datastream code: DJAREIT
& VIX: CBOE Market volatility index – from Merrill Lynch and the Wall Street
Journal.
& Interest rates: 1-month LIBOR; Overnight Index Swap (OIS) rate; 1-month
Treasury bill rate; and 1-month Treasury bill rate. LIBOR and OIS rates are from
Bloomberg. The Treasury bill rate and AA asset-backed 1-month commercial
paper rate are from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve.
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